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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many legal positivists no longer deny that there is a necessary 
connection between law and morality.1 This concession, however, 
 
        †   LL.M., James Kent Scholar, Columbia University School of Law; M.A. 
Philosophy, Graduate Center of the City University of New York; J.D., University of 
Connecticut School of Law. The author directs the appellate litigation unit at 
Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., New York, New York. I thank Michael Gentithes, David 
Lyons, Thomas H. Morawetz, Gerald J. Postema, and Brian Sheppard for having 
generously taken the time to read and comment upon earlier versions of this 
paper. I also thank Robert Alexy, John Finnis, Edward A. Purcell, Jr., and John R. 
Searle for their encouragement, as well as Professors Gregory T. Papanikos and 
David A. Frenkel and other participants in the July 14, 2015 session of the Athens 
Institute for Education and Research’s 12th Annual International Conference on 
Law. 
 1.  See Joseph Raz, Incorporation By Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2004), reprinted 
in JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW 
AND PRACTICAL REASON 182, 189 (Oxford U. Press 2009) [hereinafter RAZ, 
BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION] (acknowledging that the legal 
normative point of view derives what validity it has from the moral one); see also 
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leaves positivism’s other theses intact. Positivism’s central thesis is 
that, whether always the case, typically the case, or the case in at 
least one legal system, moral justification does not supply the 
criteria by which a rule or principle counts as legal.2 Instead, a 
society will have an overriding social practice or convergence of 
official behavior that, as a matter of social fact rather than moral 
reasoning, determines legality.3 We can then decide what the law is 
without committing ourselves to a view about which decision would 
be morally right.4 
If legality is determined by social convention, this being mainly 
a uniform judicial practice, the pull is to conclude that there is 
widespread agreement throughout the legal system about the 
ground of law and the criteria of legal validity.5 As a result, 
positivism has had a stake in presenting a picture of law in which 
theoretical disagreement is minimal. 
If theoretical disagreement in law appears to occur somewhat 
frequently, however, this cuts in favor of a non-positivist conception 
that connects legal practice to moral assessments, which are 
typically controversial and subject to widespread disagreement. For 
instance, the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin viewed theoretical 
 
Joseph Raz, About Morality and the Nature of Law, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 14 (2003), 
reprinted in RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 166, 180 (stating that law 
“is a structure of authority . . . in the business of telling people what they must do” 
and thereby “claims to have legitimate moral authority over its subjects”); SCOTT J. 
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 187 (2011) (“[T]he legal point of view always purports to 
represent the moral point of view, even when it fails to do so.”); cf. Philip Soper, 
Searching for Positivism, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1739, 1741 (1996) (reviewing WILFRID J. 
WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994)) (discussing the issue of “whether 
and why positivism can or cannot accept moral principles as part of the law”). 
 2.  Wilfrid J. Waluchow, The Many Faces of Legal Positivism, 48 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 387, 395 (1998) (noting that depending on the variant of legal positivism one 
espouses the “internally sanctioned criteria for what counts as a valid legal 
standard” will never, or may sometimes, “make reference to morality”). 
 3.  HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 258 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 1994) (1961). 
 4.  See Jeremy Waldron, Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPERS—PAPER 417 (2013), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/417?utm_source=lsr.nellco.org%2Fnyu_plltwp%
2F417&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages; cf. MATTHEW H. 
KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS 44, 59–60 
(1999) (arguing that procedural principles that some deem to provide law with an 
inner morality are, in reality, equally consistent with an evil legal system). 
 5.  Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 
1226–27 (2009); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 513–14 (1988). 
2
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disagreement in law as endemic, and this view supported his theory 
of law as rooted in moral content.6 Judges both interpret the legal 
record to determine which principle best fits the conflict and seek 
out the right answer based on their best construction of those 
principles. Because the principles that judges use to interpret the 
legal record are derived from the community’s political morality, 
disagreements over how to achieve the “right answer” will be 
especially contentious.7 
One reason that there are competing claims about the extent 
to which “theoretical disagreement” exists in law is that the term 
can be defined narrowly or broadly. The narrow view tends to focus 
on the interpretive method in constitutional or statutory disputes. 
For example, should a constitutional provision be interpreted 
based on the perceived original intent of its framers, its original 
meaning for citizens at the time, or as a shifting blueprint for the 
exercise of state power alive to contemporary values?8 Should 
evaluation of an enactment be limited to its text, or account for the 
intent of the legislators? These controversies make up the tiniest 
fraction of law’s practice, however vigorously they are disputed 
when they do arise. 
This tapered construction of “theoretical disagreement” begs 
the question in positivism’s favor. Dworkin did not see things so 
narrowly. He saw controversy as inhering in the argumentative 
 
 6.  RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 7–8 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE]; see generally Scott Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the 
Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN, CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 22, 35 (Arthur 
Ripstein ed., 2007) (explaining that Dworkin’s central retort to legal positivism is 
that “legal positivists are unable to account for a certain type of disagreements that 
legal participants frequently have”). 
 7.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 126 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; cf. 
A.E. Dick Howard, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lecture Symposium: The Indeterminacy 
of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383, 390–91 (1996) (agreeing with James 
Madison that because language is inherently imprecise, its meanings can be settled 
only upon “a series of particular discussions and adjudications”) (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST No. 37, at 179 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 1982)); Richard K. 
Sherwin, Law, Violence and Illiberal Belief, 78 GEO. L.J. 1785, 1822 (1990) (“Faced 
with a plurality of possible normative constructions of social reality, the question 
arises: How do we regulate conflicting and perhaps incommensurable ways of 
thinking and speaking about a given controversy?”). 
 8.  John O. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Our Origins, 19 HARV. J.L. 
& PUBLIC POL’Y 251, 261 (1995); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554–55 (2003). 
3
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structure of legal practice.9 When judges disagree in what Dworkin 
called “the theoretical way,” these disagreements are interpretative. 
Judges often “disagree, in large measure or in fine detail, about the 
soundest interpretation of some pertinent aspect of judicial 
practice.”10 To this point, it is difficult to deny that theoretical 
controversy is frequent in legal practice. Dworkin’s affinity with 
natural law theory derived from his further claim that law’s content 
resides in morally justified principles that practitioners should use 
to construe the community’s legal practice in the most favorable 
light.11 
Some positivists have tried to reconcile the existence of 
theoretical disagreements in law with the commitment to a social 
fact-based legal theory. For instance, Scott Shapiro suggests a view 
of legal controversy according to which interpreters debate the 
point of legal practice, which is, for him, an empirical question 
about the political attitudes and objectives of those who “designed” 
the legal system.12 Disputes about a regime’s “animating ideology” 
are disputes about social facts, and the question becomes which 
methodology best harmonizes with that scheme.13 
This article similarly seeks to reconcile the existence of 
widespread theoretical disagreement in law with a commitment to a 
social fact-based legal theory. Those disagreements are not easily 
characterized, however, as exercises in how best to defer to the 
decisions of “designers” of the legal system’s political objectives and 
divisions of labor.14 While courts and litigants do sometimes debate 
 
 9.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing the “crucial 
argumentative aspect of legal practice”). 
 10.  Id. at 87. But cf. Southard v. Morris, 31 Ohio Dec. 684, 687 (Ct. Com. Pl. 
1913) (suggesting that the legal practitioner’s duty is to argue in a way that places 
her client’s interests in the best light, including by way of “[i]llustrations, 
analogies, inferences from facts proved, and in some instances, from failure to 
introduce proof when it appears reasonable”). 
 11.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 225; see Jules L. Coleman, THE 
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST TO LEGAL THEORY 157 (Oxford 
U. Press 2001). 
 12.  Shapiro, supra note 6, at 43–47. 
 13.  Id. at 48. 
 14.  See id. at 47; Herbert L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 627 (1958) (stating an intuitively more appealing, 
albeit somewhat similar, view when he said that “the inclusion of the new case 
under the rule takes its place as a natural elaboration of the rule, as something 
implementing a ‘purpose’ which it seems natural to attribute (in some sense) to 
the rule itself rather than to any particular person dead or alive.”). 
4
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the original rationales for rules and statutory schemes, this sort of 
controversy is not particularly pervasive and does not likely account 
for a broader occurrence of theoretical disagreement.15 
By taking advantage of philosophical resources just recently 
being developed in scholarship about the logic of institutions,16 this 
article provides a more compelling reason for agreeing with 
Dworkin that theoretical disagreement in law is widespread and 
rooted in law’s argumentative structure, while at the same time 
refusing to draw the inference that morality and moral controversy 
engenders this widespread disagreement.17 
Law’s institutional nature renders nonmoral theoretical 
disagreement widely possible, and frequently actual. As an 
institution, law must comport with, and be sustained by, 
institutional logic.18 Most importantly for the purposes of this 
article, the sort of cooperation requisite to the initiation and 
maintenance of institutional reality requires that the institution in 
progress abide by two general constraints. The institution must (1) 
direct its constitutive and regulative rules at the appropriate social 
phenomenon, and (2) define its power relations and commitments 
with a sufficient level of exactness so as to render those rules and 
commitments recognizable as such reasons for action.19 
In the context of legal systems, these constraints supply a 
fertile ground for the sort of disagreement over institutional norms 
that may be described as theoretical. An understanding of the logic 
of institutional power and authority shows that “theoretical” 
disputes in law are, in the first instance, best understood as 
controversies over the standards for determining whether the 
existing legal materials are sufficiently directed at the present 
 
 15.  Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133 (2011) (arguing that 
“[d]isagreements among lawyers about the best interpretation of particular 
statutes are . . . symptoms of submerged and often unrecognized disagreements 
about” such deeper and more refined issues as democratic, political, and moral 
theory). 
 16.  See infra Section II.A; see also John R. Searle, Searle versus Durkheim and the 
Waves of Thought: Reply to Gross, in 6 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 57, 58 (2006). 
 17.  Cf. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, THE PAUL CARUS LECTURES: THE ROOTS OF 
REFERENCE 51 (1974) (“It is one thing to learn the difference between right and 
wrong, and another thing to suit the action to the word.”). 
 18.  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 19.  See infra Sections II.A.1–2; see also JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL 
WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION 154–55 (2010) [hereinafter, 
SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD] 
5
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circumstances, and whether they provide a solution to the new 
matter with sufficient exactness. Accordingly, this article will discuss 
the logical structure of institutions, with a focus on the “deontic” 
commitments—i.e., rights, obligations, duties, entitlements, and so 
forth—that institutions engender, and the “exactness” and 
“intentionality” constraints on such institutional power.20 It also 
invokes the familiar notion of “persuasive authority,” albeit from a 
new angle, to explain how institutions evolve in the face of those 
constraints.21 
Next this article will discuss the emergence of legal institutions 
as a vehicle for regulating interactions and transactions.22 These are 
the primary units of human social endeavor over which law 
exercises its institutional authority, regardless of any larger ends 
that law’s regulatory apparatus may be aimed at achieving. Law’s 
institutional constraints must permit the legal system to function as 
intended, and must ensure that it remain capable of regulating the 
relevant social transactions. Accordingly, this article will next focus 
on how understanding institutional structures and constraints may 
affect our theory of law.23 
Finally this article will demonstrate that the foregoing analysis 
of institutional logic, as applied to law, best explains the 
phenomenon in law well-described as theoretical controversy.24 
Rather than pointing primarily to a moral ground for legal validity, 
controversy in law arises in the first instance when it is uncertain 
whether existing law has created rights, duties, and obligations with 
a precision sufficient to inform the new exercise and whether, or in 
which way, the prior legal materials have been “directed at” the 
present circumstance.25 In this regard, theorists have traditionally 
been too eager to overlook disagreement about whether and how 
past legal materials and judicial decisions may fit the new situation, 
and have leapt too readily to the realm of justification.26 
 
 20.  See infra Sections II.A.1–2; SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 
19, at 152–55.  
 21.  See infra Section II.B. 
 22.  See infra Part III. 
 23.  See infra Part IV. 
 24.  See infra Part V. 
 25.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 25. 
 26.  E.g., HART, supra note 3, at 253 (explaining that, for Dworkin, “the truth 
of any proposition of law ultimately depends on the truth of a moral judgment as 
to what best justifies and since for him moral judgments are essentially 
controversial, so are all propositions of law”). 
6
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II. THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF INSTITUTIONS 
A. Searlean Analysis 
For several decades, John R. Searle has been an influential 
philosopher of mind, language, and consciousness.27 In the 1990s, 
he linked his thinking in those areas to ideas about the ways in 
which people organize their interactions and structure society, and 
has thereby become the leading philosopher of social and 
institutional reality.28 
1. What Is an Institution? 
The theory of intentional states of the mind provides the 
crossway, in Searle’s thesis, from consciousness to social structures. 
Intentional mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and ordinary 
intentions, are those that are directed to, and are about, things in 
the world.29 These need not be conscious states; I may believe that 
the Brooklyn Bridge spans the East River even when not thinking 
about this. 
There is also such a thing as collective intentionality.30 If we are 
sponsoring a conference on collective intentionality, or about Star 
Trek, then to that extent, and in that endeavor, we share certain 
intentional states such as beliefs and ordinary intentions, probably 
also desires, hopes, and fears.31 Searle sees limitations in the work 
of the pioneering philosophers addressing collective intentionality 
because they have mostly presupposed that collective or “we” 
 
 27.  E.g., John R. Searle, Meaning and Speech Acts, 71 PHIL. REV. 423, 423–32 
(1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 33 
(1969) [hereinafter SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS], JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF 
THE MIND (1992); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1997); JOHN R. 
SEARLE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE (2002). 
 28.  See Margaret Gilbert, Searle and Collective Intentions, in INTENTIONAL ACTS 
AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTS: ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 31, 31 
(Savas L. Tsohatzidis ed., 2007) (noting Searle’s “classic” 1990 work in the nascent 
field of the philosophy of social phenomena). 
 29.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 25. 
 30.  See John R. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN 
COMMUNICATION 401–16 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 25 (1995) [hereinafter SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF 
SOCIAL REALITY]. 
 31.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 25. 
7
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intentions are reducible to individual or “I” intentions.32 Searle 
argues that collective intentions are “biologically primitive” 
phenomena not reducible to individual ones: “There is no reason 
why we cannot have an irreducible we-intention in each of our 
heads when we are engaging in some cooperative activity.”33 
“[S]ocial facts” are collective intentional facts.34 Even so, these 
facts are not particularly human. Lions and wolves hunt in packs, 
birds build a nest together, and ants and bees engage in highly 
sophisticated group activities.35 A more complex form of social fact 
emerges when the group assigns a function to a thing. A branch 
can be used to perch on. A rock can be used to smash a coconut. 
But at this level, the object as it physically exists in the world allows 
it to function in that way, and its intrinsic physical features suffice.36 
Institutional facts are a certain kind of social fact. This 
uniquely human level of reality begins with the assignment of 
functions that can be fulfilled by virtue of collective recognition 
and human cooperation, and not because of an object’s intrinsic 
physical features.37 If collective acceptance underwrites the 
assignment of a function at this level, then the entity charged with 
 
 32.  See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION 143–61 (1999); 
MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 432–36 (Georg Meggle ed., 1989); SEUMAS 
MILLER, SOCIAL ACTION: A TELEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 68, 71–74, 80 (Cambridge U. 
Press 2001). 
 33.  SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 24; SEARLE, 
MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 47. For a competing position, see 
Seumas Miller, Joint Action: The Individual Strikes Back, in ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S 
SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, supra note 28, at 73 [hereinafter Miller, Joint Action] (noting 
that “the constitutive attitudes involved in joint actions are individual attitudes; 
there are no sui generis we-attitudes”); see also GILBERT, supra note 32, at 432 
(attempting to frame a middle way, stating, “[t]he conclusion seems to be that 
humans as singular agents and humans as members of plural subjects are ontologically 
on a par. Neither is prior as far as ontology goes”). 
 34.  SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 122. 
 35.  See JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN THE 
REAL WORLD 121 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson eds., 1999). Some critics say that Searle 
gives non-human animals too much credit, because while these may exhibit 
complex socially-coordinated behavior, they “do not really have shared or 
collective intentionality of the human kind.” Hannes Rakoczy & Michael 
Tomasello, The Ontogeny of Social Ontology: Steps to Shared Intentionality and Status 
Functions, in ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, supra note 28, at 113–14. 
This debate is too fine-tuned for present purposes. 
 36.  SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 38–39. 
 37.  Id. at 123–24. 
8
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fulfilling the function takes on a certain status, and the assignment 
is therefore one of a “status-function.”38 
Searle’s oft-stated example of the assignment of a status 
function imagines a primitive tribe building a wall around its 
territory. Over time, the wall erodes and eventually leaves only a 
line of stones on the ground. Now, however, rather than a wall 
functioning to keep neighbors out by virtue of its physical 
characteristics, the larger community collectively recognizes and 
accepts the boundary symbolized by the line of stones.39 A 
normative reality, unique to human culture, has emerged separate 
and apart from the physicality of the entities involved.40 Non-
human animals might be trained not to cross a line, perhaps in 
response to stimuli and conditioning,41 but their natural behavior 
would arise from a disposition, and likely not from the collective 
acceptance of a norm.42 
The logical structure of the assignment of status functions in 
human culture is “X counts as Y in context C.”43 Because this 
assignment does not depend on the brute physical structure of the 
thing at issue, language is typically the necessary medium by which 
X may count as Y in context C.44 The new status exists only by 
convention, and “words or other symbolic means” permit the 
community to signify thing X as having meaning and status Y. The 
social practice might be to treat Sitting Bull as chief, but that 
symbolic move requires thoughts and language is the vehicle of 
such thoughts.45 At this symbolic level, a normative reality emerges 
in which community members develop an evaluative attitude and 
 
 38.  Id. at 123. 
 39.  Id. at 39–40. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Ivan P. Pavlov, The Conditioned Reflex, in I.P. PAVLOV: SELECTED WORKS 245, 
248 (J. Gibbons ed., S. Belsky trans., 1955). 
 42.  See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 71. 
 43.  See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 20; see John R. 
Searle, What Is an Institution?, 1 J. INST. ECON. 1, 22 (2005). 
 44.  SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 69; cf. 
Gertrude Elizabeth M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS 69, 71 (1958) 
(describing “brute” institutional facts as “the facts which held, and in virtue of 
which, in a proper context, such-and-such a description is true or false, and which 
are more ‘brute’ than the alleged fact answering to that description”). 
 45.  SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 73 (noting 
that strictly speaking, any conventional marker will fill this role). 
9
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justified expectations that others will adhere to the status functions 
in play.46 
Searle’s next moves are particularly relevant to our analysis of 
law as an institutional phenomenon.47 To advance from private 
expectations to social structures and the creation and maintenance 
of institutions, those community members need to declare their 
status in some way, implicitly or expressly.48 It is when participants 
commit themselves in a public way to satisfy expectations, 
“according to the normative conventions of a language,” that they 
create obligations and other sorts of deontic commitments.49 Legal 
and governmental officials take an oath of office, those marrying 
say “I do,” the note in one’s hand declares itself legal tender for all 
debts, and so forth. 
Because institutional facts do not flow from the mere physical 
presence of the objects and entities comprising the institution, 
 
 46.  See Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1196 
(2015) (quoting DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 57); cf. 
Steven Schaus, How to Think About Law as Morality: A Comment on Greenberg and 
Hershovitz, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 224, 236 (2015) (“Obligatory actions are those we 
are accountable to others (including ourselves and perhaps everyone) for 
performing, and this sets them apart from actions that are only recommended.”). 
 47.  These are not necessarily next in a chronological or historical sense, but 
rather in a logical or conceptual sense, such that what has been stated so far are 
the more basic components of an explanation of institutional reality. See Aristotle, 
Metaphysics VII § 1028a 34–36, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE 1623–24 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., rev. Oxford trans., 1984) (1956). 
 48.  See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 85; cf. SAMUEL 
WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 127 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. ed., 
1929) (opining that, “to be useful,” legal doctrines must be capable of being 
understood by the ordinary citizen, hence be declared clearly); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 232–33 (William Rehg trans., The MIT Press 1998) (1992) (proffering 
a similar view). 
 49.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 88 (bypassing the 
distinction that should be made between normativity and deontology); cf. Jules L. 
Coleman, Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Misalignments, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 541, 
557 (2012) (“It is important to distinguish between the deontic and nondeontic 
areas of the normative landscape. Sometimes we assess behavior as careless, 
inattentive; but we recognize that even careless and inattentive behavior may 
provide benefits—and not merely to those who benefit by saving the costs of 
greater attentiveness or care. Other times, we characterize our conduct in terms of 
duties and rights, powers and liberties: claims we have against others, authority we 
have over them, and demands that we can stand or call upon. Roughly, the latter is 
part of the deontic area of the normative landscape; the former is not, or at least 
need not be.”). 
10
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there must be a collective recognition, and some level of 
acceptance, of the deontic status of the individuals, objects, 
procedures, forms and so forth, that make up the institution.50 This 
collective recognition might well be reducible to individual 
recognition in tandem with community members’ mutual beliefs 
about how things are.51 
But more than collective recognition is required for the 
institution to function. People must act in reliance upon, and in 
conformity with, the rights and obligations engendered by the 
institution. In other words, for non-accidental institutional 
transactions to occur, there must be not only collective recognition, 
but also cooperation and a non-reducible collective intentionality.52 
Such transactions are minimally cooperative endeavors at the least, 
rooted in a collective intention to cooperate, and usually based on 
a mutual commitment to a common set of rights and obligations 
sustained by constitutive and regulative institutional rules.53 
Now we have arrived at a fairly robust description of 
institutional reality. There are a few more things that should be 
said about the logic of this reality, as Searle has argued it. As 
shown,54 an institution must be constituted by rules that permit the 
individuals, entities, or objects involved to “count as” having a 
certain significance and status within the institution. A rule 
creating landlords’ rights to evict tenants invests them with a status 
by which they wield certain powers of eviction, and makes this the 
case by representing it as being the case.55 In linguistic terms, the 
 
 50.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 57. 
 51.  Id. at 57–58. 
 52.  See infra note 175 and accompanying text (explaining that, in order for 
institutional transactions to successfully occur, collective recognition must be 
supplemented by some minimal level of cooperation, and the institutional rules be 
deemed to be reasons for the actors’ conduct). 
 53.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 58 (using the 
example of the institution of money, explaining that whereas the “existence” of 
this institution may merely require collective recognition, the ability to engage in 
monetary transactions requires a further level of cooperation). 
 54.  See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (explaining the conceptual 
step taken from assignment to functions, based on the physical attributes of the 
entity at issue, to the assignment of status functions separate and apart from the 
physicality of the entities involved). 
 55.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 97. 
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constitutive rule announced by legal officials is a speech act known 
as a “standing declaration.”56 
In some contrast, institutions are also comprised of other sorts 
of rules, these being regulative rules that govern behavior within 
the institution.57 Rules requiring landlords to make necessary 
repairs to a dwelling, or tenants to pay their rent on time, are 
examples of regulative rules. And these, in linguistic terms, are 
known as “standing [d]irectives.”58 
It is not necessary that individual members of an institutional 
community subjectively “approve” of the institution or its rules. 
Even a transaction permeated with fear and loathing depends on a 
minimum level of cooperative intention.59 The ability to transact 
within the institution in all events requires cooperative behavior 
manifesting the “we” intention characterizing a non-reducible 
collective intentionality.60 As a product of the collective recognition 
and understanding of the rights and obligations generated by status 
functions, the institution provides participants with reasons for 
action.61 The critical and sustaining feature of institutional reasons 
for action is that these reasons are “desire-independent,” separate 
and apart from what the participants may desire for themselves at 
that moment, and arising from collective rights, obligations, and 
duties.62 The landlord may not want to repair the plumbing, or the 
tenant may not desire to pay the rent, but mostly they do so.63 
 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 103–04. 
 60.  See Gilbert, supra note 28, at 38. 
 61.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 103; cf. SAMANTHA 
BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT: REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT AND THE LAW 4 
(2005) (noting that the law functions analogously to provide disputants with 
reasons for settling their disagreements, namely, by “providing us with a way to 
agree to disagree or agree on how to do so”). 
 62.  See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 70; 
SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 127–31; cf. JOSEPH RAZ, 
PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 183 (Oxford U. Press, 1999) (1975) (explaining 
that “[a]n exclusionary reason merely requires us to avoid something which other 
reasons make legitimate, but do not require”). Searle dissents from classical views 
of rationality, which deny the feasibility of desire-independent reasons for action. 
See JOHN R. SEARLE, RATIONALITY IN ACTION 10, 26 (2001). As an aside, the subtle 
distinctions between Searlean desire-independent reasons and Hartian and Razian 
“content-independent” peremptory reasons become particularly interesting in 
light of recent positivist views about the connection between law and morality. 
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Now these are just John Searle’s views of the logic of 
institutional reality, or at least an attempt to paraphrase them. 
Other thinkers may have other views, although much of the debate 
in this area focuses on Searle’s philosophy.64 We next ask, what are 
the key implications of his theory, and what constraints do they 
entail? 
2. Institutional Constraints 
For Searle, the core feature of institutions is their structuring 
of deontic power, a means by which people are induced to do what 
the institution requires of them.65 This power usually resides in the 
creation of desire-independent reasons for action, within the 
institutional setting.66 In this regard, “A has power over S with 
respect to action B if and only if A can intentionally get S to do 
what A wants regarding B, whether S wants to do it or not.”67 
The sort of intentionality most important here is the ordinary 
kind, by which A intends a certain outcome.68 If A intends that S 
 
HERBERT L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON 
BENTHAM 243–44 (1982); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35–36 (Oxford 
U. Press 1988) (1986). 
 63.  See also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 22 (Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 
1969) (describing the ways in which “duties generally can be traced to the 
principle of reciprocity,” such that, in the example just given, the landlord’s and 
tenant’s desire-independent reasons will be interdependent). 
 64.  See generally Miller, Joint Action, supra note 33; Mattia Gallotti & John 
Michael, Objects in Mind, in 4 STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIALITY: 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL ONTOLOGY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 5 (Mattia Gallotti & 
John Michael eds., 2014) (“The recent debate on social facts has grown from the 
pioneering work of John Searle, whose conceptual apparatus is now taken widely, 
though not unquestionably, as the starting point of most analyses of social 
ontology.”). 
 65.  See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 148–51, 169. 
 66.  JOHN R. SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON FREE WILL, 
LANGUAGE, AND POLITICAL POWER 9 (2007) [hereinafter SEARLE, FREEDOM AND 
NEUROBIOLOGY]. 
 67.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 151. 
 68.  See Leo Zaibert, Intentions, Promises, and Obligations, in CONTEMPORARY 
PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 52, 60 (Barry Smith ed., 2003) (suggesting that the 
distinctions Searle draws in other work—differentiating between “prior intentions” 
and “intentions-in-action,”—may be of limited usefulness even in the context of 
Searle’s own theory); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 211, 213, 309 (“[T]he 
institutionality [sic] of law is ultimately grounded in intentions.”). This analysis is 
moored in a view that likens laws to plans, and law to a planning mechanism 
aimed at settling society’s moral disputes. Shapiro’s approach thereby appears to 
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stop his car at the corner and has the capability and authority to 
erect a stop sign there, then A has power over S in that context. 
Other sorts of intentional content will also come into play, such as 
the parties’ beliefs about driving and road signs, their fears or 
anxieties about being ticketed by the police, and their hopes 
concerning safety.69 
Human beings ordinarily exercise power through their speech 
acts and the typical form of this exercise is the standing directive.70 
So this exercise of power must have an intentional, or propositional 
content, meaning that the exercise of power must be about, or be 
directed at, something.71 The propositional content should convey 
conditions capable of being satisfied by the institutional actors.72
 Searle describes two relevant constraints on the concept of 
power that inform the logic of institutional reality. First, the 
concept of power is logically connected to the concept of the 
intentional exercise of power—toward what end is the power 
intended, believed or perhaps desired to be exercised; Searle calls 
this the “intentionality constraint.”73 “The intentional exercise of 
power may have unintended consequences,” and the intention may 
sometimes even be unconscious.74 Perhaps, for example, the 
crossing guard moves the child on towards school while being 
conscious only of getting her to the other side of the street. 
Nevertheless, the crossing guard’s authority arises in the context of 
the institution’s collective intention to educate the child. 
Notably, intentionality in the ordinary sense of intending a 
certain outcome is self-referential. If we intend the object in the 
corner to be a chair, we must think of it as a chair.75 If one intends 
to get to Chicago by train, in order for this intention to be satisfied, 
 
rely on intentionality as limited to ordinary intentions, those that “take plans as 
their objects.” Id. at 127. 
 69.  See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 25. 
 70.  Id. at 97. 
 71.  Fred I. Dretske, The Intentionality of Cognitive States, in 5 MIDWEST STUDIES 
IN PHILOSOPHY 281 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1980), reprinted in THE NATURE OF 
MIND 354, 354 (David M. Rosenthal ed., 1991). 
 72.  Cf. SCOTT SOAMES, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA—AND OTHER 
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 75 (2014) (arguing that “we must derive 
the intentionality of propositions from the intentionality of those who entertain 
them”). 
 73.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 151. 
 74.  Id. at 151. 
 75.  SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 53. 
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the intention itself must figure causally in the outcome, here 
arriving in Chicago by train.76 The same would not be the case if we 
simply desired to get to Chicago, without yet intending how to 
bring this about. 
The second constraint on the concept of power is the 
“exactness constraint.”77 For the institution to function, and for 
participants to recognize its nature and know what may be 
expected of them, the intentional content of the power relations 
upholding the institution—that is, what has been collectively 
intended and believed to be the case—should be sufficiently 
specified.78 Participants in the institution must be capable of 
knowing, although they need not actually know, what is expected of 
them, and more generally what status-functions have been 
assigned.79 
Recall that Searle’s formula for constitutive rules is: fact “X 
counts as status Y in context C.”80 The Y term is not sustained by 
virtue of the physicality of the object or entity, and so there must be 
an intersubjective appreciation, and collective acceptance, of the 
assignment of the status-function.81 The assignment must be 
sufficiently specified to permit such collective recognition.82 It is 
also a condition of ascribing legitimacy to an exercise of power that 
one be able to say who holds the power, who is subject to that 
power, and what is the intended effect of its exercise.83 If the logic 
of institutional reality rests on intended outcomes, assigned status 
functions, collectively-held intentions, and collective recognition or 
acceptance of the resulting institutional structures, as Searle 
 
 76.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 36. 
 77.  Id. at 152. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. Of course, participants in an institution need not “discuss” power 
even when exercising or being affected by it. However, status functions must be 
assigned with sufficient exactness to render such a discussion possible in a 
“satisfactory” way. 
 80.  See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 40. 
 81.  Id. at 39–41; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW 
AND MORALITY 147 (2d ed. 2009) (saying, for example, that “laws are normally the 
product of authoritative acts”). 
 82.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 152. 
 83.  See id. at 155; see also ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 
21 (2d ed. 2005) (“From the perspective of pragmatics, an act of communication 
succeeds if and only if the hearer recognizes S’s intention.”). 
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contends,84 there will have to be some level of specificity in the 
intentions and assignments underlying the deontic powers thereby 
created and sustained.85 
The Finnish moral and social philosopher Raimo Tuomela has 
articulated a quite Searlean account of social structures.86 He 
specifies that several kinds of activities or entities can qualify as a 
social institution.87 These include social practices (such as sauna 
bathing on Saturdays in Finland), objects (such as money), 
individual properties (such as ownership), linguistic entities (such 
as natural language), interpersonal states (such as marriage), and 
social organizations, most of which are typically society-wide, norm-
governed group practices.88 He interestingly adds, however, that 
 
 84.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 57; cf. id. at 103–04 
(“One mark of recognition or acceptance is continued usage of the institution and 
institutional facts . . . . Acceptance need not take the form of an explicit speech act 
and can range all the way from enthusiastic endorsement to grudging 
acquiescence.”). Again, while Searle’s social ontology is the most influential 
programme at play in the area of social philosophy, and is enlisted as a foundation 
for this Article’s discussion of controversy in law, each of his contentions may be 
subject to dispute and interpretation. E.g., George P. Fletcher, Law, in 
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN FOCUS 85, 99 (Barry Smith ed., 2003) (“When 
modern legislatures start enacting new laws, these laws become binding—at least 
according to the conventional view—not because they are accepted but because 
they are validly enacted.”). 
 85.  See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 181, 181 (1988) (effectively referring to the functional of 
competition over the federal government’s intentionality in assigning state and 
federal officials the status of implementing federal law); Note, Reforming the Initial 
Sale Requirements of the Private Placement Exemption, 86 HARV. L. REV. 403, 407 (1972) 
(suggesting that the Supreme Court’s intended outcomes will be defeated when its 
stated standards “are so vague that they do not offer a workable basis” for 
construing statutes); cf. In re Williams, No. 1999CA000128, 2000 WL 222033, at *2 
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2000) (emphasizing that the “vagueness doctrine . . . 
applies to legislation that lacks clarity and precision”). 
 86.  RAIMO TUOMELA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIALITY: THE SHARED POINT OF 
VIEW 182–211 (Oxford U. Press, 2007). Whereas Searle grounds his analysis in the 
deontic status and status functions informing the logic of institutions, Tuomela’s 
focus is more broadly concerned with the conceptual and social status that 
characterizes institutional reality and he deems Searle’s view to involve a 
“stronger” kind of social institution. Id. at 196–97; see id. at 203 (saying that 
“Searlean deontic status can be reinterpreted to be a subcase” of Tuomela’s 
expression of a social institution). In all events, these distinctions should not come 
into serious play regarding law and legal institutions. 
 87.  Id. at 194. 
 88.  Id. 
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“[o]nly group items that are represented as existing by the group 
are institutional.”89 This should not mean that all community 
members will have to be conscious of the norm or practice, or even 
support these without conflict; it might be the case that a small 
group of officials specify the norm, rule, or structure, so long as the 
larger group collectively recognizes the general ethos upon which 
the officials may act.90 One further insight by Searle, significant 
enough to keep in mind, is that higher levels of status functions can 
be imposed on entities that have previously been assigned status 
functions.91 A relatively simple institution can thereby engender a 
more complex one. Promises, for instance, have status functions 
because they are collectively recognized as carrying obligations or 
duties to make good on the promise.92 But in a certain setting, and 
at a logically higher level—one, that is, that refers to, incorporates, 
and contextualizes the deontic force of the promise as such—a 
promise can create a contract or count as a necessary step toward 
marriage.93 
More schematically, in the collective intentional assignment of 
the form, “X counts as Y in context C,” the Y term in the simpler 
institution can become the X term in the more complex one.94 
Stones on the ground may count as a boundary neighbors 
collectively accept they should not cross in the simpler setting, but 
iterating upward the boundary may mark off a separate political or 
quasi-political territory. Or as Searle puts it, an utterance (X1) may 
count as a promise (Y1) in C1, but under certain circumstances C2, 
that very promise (X2) counts as a contract (Y2).95 Now with the 
contract itself as a context (or Y2 = C3), a particular action as X3 
can count as its breach (Y3), and so on.96 
B. The Logical Role of Persuasive Authority 
We should now have approximately set out Searle’s project. 
There is one refinement worth making for the legal theory context, 
and in respect of institutions generally. This refinement is 
 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See id. at 31. 
 91.  SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 80. 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at 82. 
 94.  Id. at 80. 
 95.  Id. at 125. 
 96.  Id.  
17
Golanski: Nonmoral Theoretical Disagreement in Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
7 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:56 PM 
242 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:225 
important because institutional philosophy has not yet fully fleshed 
out the logic of institutional evolution. The literature speaks to the 
logical role played by status function assignments within the 
institution,97 but not yet the structural factors motivating and 
legitimizing the evolution of such assignments and institutional 
change over time. The concept of persuasive authority should 
provide a fruitful research program in this regard.98 
Searle does not distinguish much between power and 
authority.99 This is not to say that he finds them synonymous; 
rather, authority falls within the range of deontic powers, which for 
Searle “are rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, permissions, 
privileges, authority and the like.”100 Although Searle does not say 
more about the discrete nature of authority, he seems to use the 
term in a familiar way. His sense of “authority” is the one that flows 
both from and constitutes institutional power, and that is 
interwoven with duties, rights, and obligations.101 As one example, 
an official within an institution will have the authority to perform 
certain acts. 
There is another sense of “authority” that is sometimes 
complimentary, but not subordinate or tantamount, to institutional 
deontic power. In this second sense, authority is minimally a 
linguistic source capable of influencing intentional states, but 
without imposing obligations.102 In everyday parlance we speak of 
the “power to persuade.”103 A linguistic source is presented or 
becomes available in some way, rises to conscious awareness, and 
carries an influential force capable of affecting beliefs.104 
 
 97.  See, e.g., SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 46. 
 98.  See generally Chad Flanders, Towards a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 
OKLA. L. REV. 55, 63–64 (2009). 
 99.  See, e.g., SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 8–9 
(generally classifying “rights, duties, obligations, requirements, permissions, 
authorizations, entitlements, and so on” as “deontic powers” engendered and 
carried by status functions). 
 100.  SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY, supra note 66, at 98. 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  E.g., NICHOLAS HARPSFIELD, TREATISE ON THE PRETENDED DIVORCE 
BETWEEN HENRY VIII AND CATHERINE OF ARAGON 232 (Camden Society 1878) 
(stating, “[t]hen lasheth he forth many authorities and examples”). 
 103.  Henry P. Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of 
State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1934 (2003) (discussing 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)). 
 104.  Cf. Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial 
Responsibility, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 774–75 (1999) (struggling to convey a sense of 
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The two senses of authority may in general be aligned as 
“practical” and “theoretical,” respectively. Much has been written 
about the effects of the former sort of authority within and upon 
institutions, particularly law.105 Theoretical authority, on the other 
hand, is typically rooted in an expertise, but usually without the 
intent and ability to impose duties that characterize practical 
authority.106 This sort of authority may be an object, perhaps a 
document, an affair, individual, or entity, always linguistically 
expressed, that may originate within the institution107 or that may 
derive from an “other-institutional”108 or non-institutional source. 
Consider, for instance, two books about a national park. One 
conveys authority in the first sense. It sets out the rules and 
regulations for use of the park (Searle’s “standing directives”), 
discusses the agency charged with issuing those rules, and cites the 
statute establishing (by “standing declaration” in Searle’s 
terminology) the agency and the regulatory scheme for the 
national park. The second book, perhaps issued by an unaffiliated 
group of “friends of the park,” is dedicated to revealing scenic 
routes that may be taken in the park, the location of its streams and 
waterfalls, and so forth.109 The interesting aspect of this example is 
 
the search for persuasive authority in the legal context, including the search for 
authority “in the context of ancestral judicial experience”). 
 105.  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 37 (Clarendon Press 1986) 
(“Orders and commands are among the expressions typical of practical authority. 
Only those who claim authority can command.”). 
 106.  Compare HERBERT L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in 
READINGS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: AUTHORITY 92, 107 (Joseph Raz ed., 
1990) (noting that theoretical authorities may hold sway over matters of belief 
rather than conduct), with Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, in READINGS IN 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: AUTHORITY 115, 123 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990) 
(explaining that practical authorities may fulfill the function of imposing duties, 
among other functions). 
 107.  The persuasive source contemplated here originates within, or has been 
issued by, the institution, but not as an item imbued with deontic powers. See infra 
note 109. 
 108.  Exemplifying the use of other-institutional sources as persuasive 
authorities in the legal context, for example, is Justice John Paul Stevens opinion 
in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988), taking guidance from the 
policies of several foreign nations concerning the death penalty. 
 109.  The book on scenic routes may, of course, have been issued by the 
agency itself in charge of the park, hence institutionally, and yet, because of its 
content and intended purpose, does not carry deontic authority. But right now we 
are interested only in the possibility that the source is extra-institutional. 
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the non- or other-institutional source of the authority. The 
institution may incorporate or adopt the authority, perhaps by 
offering the “friends” book at the park’s gift shop, or by 
recommending it to visitors. In this case, the institution will have 
changed, to that extent. 
Nor is the sort of authority just discussed—that is, of an 
influential or persuasive source—the same as bare influence. Many 
extra-institutional factors, including weather conditions, 
manipulations of a resource, and so on, may exert bare influence 
over institutions.110 These will not qualify as persuasive authority. 
Nor need the “exercise” of influence, a human endeavor, be 
linguistic, as when someone pulls the lever that may release the 
flood waters. These sorts of events and efforts, however, also do not 
qualify as “authority.” 
But more precisely, the sort of persuasive authority we are 
concerned with here need not necessarily be theoretical, and need 
not necessarily embody any expertise. It is, as stated, a linguistic 
source capable of influencing intentional states, but without 
imposing obligations.111 This persuasive authority may comprise a 
system of background norms or an independently existing 
institution. Perhaps it is a dress code, for example, or Robert’s 
Rules of Order, systems of norms not adopted by the particular 
institution at issue. Once adopted, however, those authorities may 
now be enforced in the context of the adoptive institution.112 
Absent persuasive authority or other outside influence, it 
would be difficult to explain how institutions evolve. For example, 
the medieval community may decide, by some accepted procedure, 
to use squirrel pelt as their form of money; until the group 
 
 110.  See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 62, at 99 (noting that such exertions of influence 
as manipulation of the money supply will affect “people’s reasons for action,” but 
are “not the exercise of normative powers”). 
 111.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 112.  Cf. Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three 
Problems of Scope, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 113–14 (2009) (“Voluntary lesson drawing, 
according to [Richard] Rose, occurs when domestic policy-makers are dissatisfied 
with the existing state of affairs; define the problem and mark it as potentially 
solvable through the adoption of new rules, institutions or policies; look outside 
their domestic system to an external source identified as a potential model for 
emulation; form the perception that the external practices, rules or institutions 
are successful in solving difficulties identical, or at least comparable to those at 
home; and determine that the external rules are not only technically transferable, 
but politically acceptable.”). 
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collectively accepts this change, squirrel pelt does not have the 
status or function of money within that institution, and is an extra-
institutional item.113 This is a trivial point on its own. However, 
perhaps the institutional criteria for selecting the medium of 
exchange are portability and intrinsic value, being a medium not 
too plentiful yet not too scarce.114 Less than ideal experience with 
squirrel pelt exchange leads to mammalogical inquiry,115 and soon 
the institutional criteria themselves are modified to include 
durability and divisibility. Extra-institutional persuasive authority—
which in law may derive either from non-legal sources or from 
precedents set down in other jurisdictions—has guided 
institutional evolution.116 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 
As a conceptual matter, people interact prior to, and without 
the necessity of, a legal system. We will stipulate that when an 
interaction results in gain or loss, the interaction is a transaction. 
The set of interactions that are transactions may be equal to or 
some portion of the full set of interactions. Some would say that the 
set of transactions is necessarily greater, since perhaps we can 
effectively transact at a distance without interacting.117 But here we 
presuppose that any such transaction suffices to be deemed an 
interaction, that is, some sort of action or influence upon another 
that may or may not involve gain or loss. 
 
 113.  See TUOMELA, supra note 86, at 183, 186. 
 114.  WILLIAM S. JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE 25–26 
(Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. eds., 7th ed. 1885) (noting many of the types of 
objects that have been used as currency in various cultures, such as whale’s teeth 
by the Fijians, the Egyptians’ engraved stones, corn by the Norwegians and ancient 
Greeks, olive oil in the Ionian Islands, and cacao nuts in the Yucutan). 
 115.  See NORTH AMERICAN FUR AUCTIONS, WILD FUR PELT HANDLING MANUAL 30 
(2009) (instructing that for use of a squirrel pelt, “The front feet should be cut off 
close to the body, leaving just enough to tuck in to the fur side. The tail must be 
split. Not doing this can result in taint due to the lack of exposure to the air.”). 
 116.  See, e.g., Reid v. Life Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 1983) (looking 
to precedents in other jurisdictions for persuasive authority); cf. City of Milwaukee 
v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul. & Pac. R.R. (Milwaukee Road), 269 N.W. 688, 689 (Wis. 
1936); United States v. Magluta, 198 F.3d 1265, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A] district 
court’s error is not ‘plain’ or ‘obvious’ if there is no precedent directly resolving 
an issue.”), vacated on other grounds, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 117.  See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 
111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1321 (2002). 
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Transacting happens in various ways, both intentionally and 
accidentally. People injure one another, sometimes intentionally, 
sometimes accidentally.118 They make promises, carve out territory 
and spaces for living and for more transacting, and also plan for 
lots of things, including death. Something happens between us 
once and then twice. We become motivated, by our psychology and 
nature, to structure the next interaction efficiently because the 
alternative is waste.119 
As transactions, broadly defined to include accidental 
occurrences, take place in the pre-legal social group—promising, 
injuring, planning and so forth—they give rise to entitlements, 
commitments, obligations, and other deontic facts, including 
deontic emotions such as blame and resentment.120 Questions 
inevitably arise about how to organize, coordinate, and prioritize 
those obligations, resentments, powers, and practiced means to 
intended ends.121 Security and liberty interests are at stake and must 
be balanced. Without a structure for accomplishing these ends, 
however, the smooth functioning of the group cannot get off the 
ground or continue. A legal system emerges, which begins with 
collectively-recognized regulative and constitutive rules.122 Legal 
practice arising in the legal system brings with it an argumentative 
structure and argument about the nature of that argumentative 
structure.123 
 
 118.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspaper, Inc., 346 P.2d 488, 490 (Cal. 
1959) (“[A] right to relief arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions exists where several plaintiffs sue for personal injuries suffered in the 
same accident.”). 
 119.  Cf. Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Recognizing Faces of Other Ethnic Groups, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36, 64 (2001) (describing how a certain face recognition 
schema “allows for quicker and more effective processing, just as other types of 
recurring patterns are processed more efficiently and automatically”). 
 120.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 147–48; see also 
Carla Bagnoli, INTRODUCTION TO MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 1, 26 (Carla Bagnoli 
ed., 2011). 
 121.  See Joseph Raz, Introduction to AUTHORITY 1, 7 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990) 
(expressing the view that “the need to secure coordination is one of the main 
arguments for political authority”). 
 122.  See Fletcher, supra note 84, at 85–86. 
 123.  See generally DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 24–26; 
Peder B. Hong, A Theory of Final Argument in Civil Trials, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 31, 55 
(1997); cf. Colin S. Diver, Sound Governance and Sound Law—Administrative Law: 
Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1436, 1446 (1991) (book 
review) (questioning whether “judicial pluralism” is justified, given the varied 
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This view has affinities with Dworkin, for whom law’s “most 
abstract and fundamental” point was to “guide and constrain” 
governmental coercion.124 This approach constructively interprets 
past political decisions and thereby views those decisions in their 
best light from a moral point of view to determine when collective 
force is justified.125 There is a logic to constructive interpretation by 
which the project manifests in various stages, each involving a 
“different degree[] of consensus” within the community.126 
Although Dworkin did not speak in terms of the logical structure of 
his approach, he made it clear that the first stage—the “pre-
interpretive” stage—was conceptually prior.127 This is the stage at 
which we identify the rules and standards, perhaps the statutory 
words, taken to provide the tentative content of the practice, but at 
which “a very great degree of consensus is needed.”128 
For Dworkin, skepticism about whether a regime resting on 
little more than the raw data identified at the pre-interpretive stage 
comprises anything beyond a tentative or minimally “legal” system 
is justified.129 That view seems wise. At the same time, Dworkin’s 
pre-interpretive stage generally coincides with what we have just 
described as the conceptually primary stage characterizing the 
emergence of a legal system.130 Dworkin’s second, “interpretive,” 
and third, “post-interpretive,” stages involve increasing levels of 
disputation concerning which outcomes best fit and justify the 
prior materials, and correspondingly lesser degrees of community 
consensus, and hence the proliferation of theoretical 
disagreement.131 
If we go a bit further and ask toward what end government 
coercion would be exercised in the first place, the answer by our 
model is to regulate transactions, broadly defined, as these 
 
reasoning and outcomes that would depend “on the convictions of the judge or 
panel involved”). 
 124.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 93. 
 125.  Id.; HART, supra note 3, at 248. 
 126.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 65. 
 127.  Id. at 65–66. 
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id. at 103–04. 
 130.  See supra text accompanying notes 120–23 (suggesting that human 
interactions engender promising, injuring, planning, and so forth, these giving 
rise to deontic commitments, rights and obligations, and the inception of primary 
legal rules and principles).  
 131.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 66–67. 
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naturally arise within the community. This regulative apparatus, in 
turn, may serve any of a number of political ends, including social 
domination, dispute resolution, or other ends. In all events, the 
conceptually prior scheme—or “pre-interpretive” stage in 
Dworkinian terms—consists in regulative and constitutive rules 
and, perhaps, standards.132 
The definitions of regulative and constitutive rules at least 
appear to neatly distinguish them. Frederick Schauer explains that 
constitutive rules are rules that “create the very possibility of 
engaging in conduct of a certain kind. They define and thereby 
constitute activities that could not otherwise even exist.”133 The 
rules of chess create the possibility of playing chess; they do not, 
however, make possible the movement of wooden medieval pieces 
on a checkered board. Regulative rules, on the other hand, are 
seen as governing antecedently or independently existing behavior 
and behavioral patterns.134 In practice, however, rules that may be 
thought of as constitutive—often, but certainly not always, being 
procedural—“have their regulative side.”135 Thus, to some 
significant extent, the distinction between regulative and 
constitutive rules will be vague.136 
The rules of law are sometimes constitutive of state-enforced 
rights and obligations. Due process principles, for example, may 
constitute the procedural fairness that is due to parties facing 
 
 132.  See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1773, 1786 (2006). 
 133.  FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 6 (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz 
eds., 1991); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 25–28 (1955). 
 134.  SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra note 27, at 33. 
 135.  SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 7; cf. Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive 
Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political 
Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371, 397–98 (2012) (noting one scholar’s 
argument “that constitutional self-binding is both regulative and constitutive, 
limiting and creative, disabling and enabling”) (citing STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS 
& CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995)); RAZ, supra 
note 62, at 109 (“There is nothing in Searle’s explanation to suggest that his 
classification is exclusive, that the same rule cannot be both regulative and 
constitutive.”). 
 136.  E.g., Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, A Behavioral Critique of Searle’s Theory of 
Institutions, in ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, supra note 28, at 175, 
178 (“Contracts are constitutive rules that define the rights and obligations of the 
parties who enter into some exchange . . . . Yet, the exchange is not made possible 
by the contract.”). 
24
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/13
7 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:56 PM 
2016] NONMORAL THEORETICAL DISAGREEMENT IN LAW 249 
punitive measures from legal adjudicators.137 Yet once the legal 
system, or any other sort of institution, is functional, the 
constitutive rules “lose their constitutive character within those 
institutions, serving instead to regulate antecedently defined 
behavior.”138 
As group members interacting—or at least theories about this 
or the representations the members bring into the interactions—is 
conceptually prior to their law, so is the community’s construction 
of innumerable rights and obligations, balancing security and 
liberty interests, conceptually, prior to law’s prescriptions. These 
informal deontic structures evolve into webs of background norms 
that both influence behavior and empower, subtly or bluntly, 
coercive responses to violations of those norms.139 Courts develop 
their embodied or practical philosophies by determining which 
rights and obligations law should enforce. These, in turn, 
dialectically influence the community’s norms.140 The legal system’s 
coercive capability may not be strictly necessary to a concept of law, 
but “in the world of law as it exists and as it is experienced, 
coercion is rampant and sanctions are omnipresent.”141 
The legal system may create a rule for enforcing promises as 
follows: “A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach 
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the 
law in some way recognizes as a duty.”142 In the area of personal 
injury, members of the group internalize a sense of obligation 
when its breach gives rise to some level of collective resentment 
because it violates a governing norm the group may reasonably be 
expected to infer.143 People liberally assign fault, even when actual 
 
 137.  ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL 
STUDY 343 (2006). 
 138.  SCHAUER, supra note 133, at 7. 
 139.  See generally SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 155; 
ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 56 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D. 
Halls trans., 1982) (1895),(“An outburst of collective emotion in a gathering . . . is 
a product of shared existence, of actions and reactions called into play between 
the consciousnesses of individuals.”). 
 140.  See generally Janine Young Kim, Hate Crime Law and the Limits of 
Inculpation, 84 NEB. L. REV. 846, 888 (2006). 
 141.  Frederick Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 YALE L.J. 586, 605 (2010). 
 142.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). 
 143.  See generally Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, reprinted in MORAL 
DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 179, 197 (Stephen 
Darwall et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 1997). 
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fault is improbable.144 The legal system may declare that duty in tort 
is an obligation or set of obligations to adhere to a particular 
standard of care, which the law recognizes as binding across the 
community, and for the injurious breach of which the law allows a 
private remedy.145 Criminal law, as well as tort, may develop to 
safeguard the community from freewheeling resorts to the vendetta 
or blood feud.146 
As the legal system evolves, aiming to fulfill its primary mission 
of regulating the people’s broad range of transactions, it is both the 
sovereign’s unique governing apparatus, and abstractly 
institutional. The notion that legal systems emerge to regulate 
transactions is not intended to restrict our view of the range of 
possible purposes that may drive the emergence or maintenance of 
a legal system, or of any legal system. The primary engagement 
between law and its subjects is at the level of the legal system’s 
regulation of their transactions, which are a species of their 
interactions.147 Toward which end law regulates these transactions, 
whether this be social domination and control, dispute resolution, 
the constructive ordering of norms or morality, or some other aim 
or combination of aims, poses a different question. 
Legal philosophers have not paid much recent attention to 
law’s institutional constraints, which if soundly analyzed should 
inform their view of law’s nature. Searle’s original and elegant 
theory about institutions, whether accepted in whole or in part, 
should significantly impact this discussion.148 Thinking about law’s 
institutional nature may, in turn, help refocus our understanding 
of controversy in law. 
 
 144.  See Ray Glier, Dodgers’ Jones Plumbs Depths of Hitting Slump, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/sports/baseball/22jones 
.html?_r=0. 
 145.  See Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007); A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. 
Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Neb. 2010). 
 146.  HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 53–54 (1983). 
 147.  See supra text accompanying note 117. 
 148.  See generally Fletcher, supra note 84, at 101 (noting that “[o]ur easy 
reliance” upon Searle’s terminology “illustrates how useful Searle’s conceptual 
framework can be in formulating views in legal philosophy”). 
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IV. BECAUSE LEGAL SYSTEMS ARE INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS MUST APPLY TO THEM 
Legal systems regulate transactions, but what regulates legal 
systems? The answer should be, first, the structural requirements 
that constrain all institutions, and, second, institution-specific 
secondary rules that constrain the actions of legal officials. Of 
these, structural constraints pertaining to all institutions must be 
prior. Any secondary rule contrary to those constraints would 
undermine the system’s institutional grounding.149 
If the logic of institutions entails that they are constrained by 
intentionality and exactness conditions, then the same must hold 
for law. The nature and complexity of legal systems as institutions 
will diverge dramatically from that of other sorts of institutions.150 
Nevertheless, the strong thesis upholding the new social ontology is 
that all human institutional reality derives from, and rests on, the 
assignment of status functions and is constrained by conditions of 
intentionality and exactness.151 Those constraints upon institutional 
power should similarly constrain legal institutional power. 
This is not necessarily to agree, with thinkers such as Scott 
Hershovitz, who seeks to transcend the Hart-Dworkin debate, that 
there is no distinctively legal domain of normativity.152 However, as 
suggested earlier, human interactions and transactions, and the 
range of deontic and normative phenomena which these give rise 
to, are conceptually prior to the emergence of legal systems.153 To 
that extent, the thesis here, like Hershovitz’s, may be characterized 
as “eliminativist [sic].”154 
 
 149.  See generally FULLER, supra note 63, at 39 (demonstrating as a practical 
matter, for instance, that a secondary rule prohibiting the issuance of any 
additional rules, precluding the publication of rules which would permit subjects 
to know what they are “expected to observe,” or other secondary rules which 
would effectively defeat law’s intentionality and exactness constraints, would 
thereby defeat the idea that there is “a legal system at all”). 
 150.  See Schaus, supra note 46, at 236. 
 151.  See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 151–52. 
 152.  See Hershovitz, supra note 46, at 1173–74. 
 153.  See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text (positing a conceptual 
ordering from the social engagement of human beings in interactions and 
transactions, to the consequent emergence of rights and obligations, and, on that 
conceptual foundation, to the initiation of a legal system). 
 154.  Hershovitz, supra note 46, at 1193–95. 
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It may nevertheless seem to be somewhat of a non sequitur to 
take the further step, with Dworkin in his wonderful final book 
Justice for Hedgehogs, of viewing law as a branch of political 
morality.155 Hershovitz, however, takes the eliminativist position to 
“vindicate[] Dworkin’s suggestion that people disagree about what 
the law requires because they disagree about the moral significance 
of our legal practices.”156 This puts the cart before the horse, for 
even if law does not generate its own distinctive domain of 
normativity, nonmoral disagreements rooted in law’s institutional 
nature may best explain—as a conceptual and, perhaps, empirical 
matter—the widespread nature of theoretical controversy in legal 
practice. 
Again following the general contours of Searle’s argument, all 
institutional reality depends on a basic level of human cooperation, 
not necessarily for good, and possibly secured by coercion, but 
rooted in the collective recognition of rights, obligations, duties, 
and authority, that give subjects desire-independent reasons for 
action in the institutional context.157 This collective recognition is 
the glue that permits observer-relative institutional facts to exist. To 
sustain the institution, these power relations and commitments 
must both be intended, or at least be capable of being interpreted 
as intended, and defined with a sufficient level of exactness. 
When a legal case begins, or when a legal issue arises, the first 
step for the parties or the court is to discern whether the existing 
legal materials—prior decisions, enactments, and so forth—point 
the way ahead. If the answer is clearly “yes,” law is likely, but 
certainly not strictly compelled, to accept that outcome and resolve 
the matter. If not clear, the court will summon some manner of 
persuasive authority.158 But either way, the controversy that defines 
the case will at the outset be characterized by a claim that one 
outcome or the other is supported by existing institutional facts 
which are directed at the new situation. 
Institutional logic, no less when it comes to legal institutions, 
demands that the community be capable of recognizing that the 
case has been presented, that the empowered official or panel has 
 
 155.  DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 15, at 405. 
 156.  Hershovitz, supra note 46, at 1195. 
 157.  See SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY, supra note 66, at 9. 
 158.  See, e.g., Reid, 718 F.2d at 680 (“In deciding a question of first 
impression, the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions are persuasive 
authority.”). 
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resolved the case, and that, as a result, the party or parties involved 
must do this or refrain from doing that. Legal officials may 
systematically conceal the outcome, perhaps by trucking the subject 
away at midnight to an obscure gulag, but, in that case, the 
community is capable of recognizing that this sort of “infraction” is 
tragically handled by means of that sort of exercise of power.159 
In a legal system, officials and participants intend that the 
parties to a proceeding will leave with a sense that they understand 
what is next expected of them, or at least that what has occurred is 
capable of being construed and explained to them in rational 
discourse.160 Although this should usually happen, some 
contingencies will not have been addressed, which may engender 
contention for future actors in their later case. Alternatively, the 
future actors may view the prior case as settling certain aspects of 
the new affair, but not others. The entity charged with 
interpretation, typically the court, will usually discern a minimal 
content that has previously been determined with sufficient 
specificity.161 
Were the parties to a case or controversy to leave the scene 
without the sense of a certain level of clarity about the rule or norm 
that has resolved the matter, or that will thereafter govern their 
interactions, the system would be appropriately criticized as having 
failed to function in its communications, and more broadly in 
fulfilling its institutional role of regulating transactions.162 
Although depicting law’s institutional constraints as the 
workings of its internal morality, Lon Fuller famously articulated 
 
 159.  See generally Sherwin, supra note 7, at 1793. 
 160.  See WILLISTON, supra note 48, at 127–28 (“[T]he law must be applied by 
men engaged in practical affairs and by so many of them that to be useful a legal 
doctrine must be capable of being understood and stated by men who are neither 
profound scholars nor interested in abstract thought.”); cf. HABERMAS, supra note 
48, at 232–33 (“[T]he legitimacy of legal statutes is determined not only by the 
rightness of moral judgments but, among other things, by the availability, cogency, 
relevance and selection of information; by how fruitful such information proves to 
be; by how appropriately the situation is interpreted and the issue framed.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 269 N.W. at 689; Magluta, 198 F.3d at 1280 
(“[A] district court’s error is not ‘plain’ or ‘obvious’ if there is no precedent 
directly resolving an issue.”), vacated on other grounds, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 
2000). 
 162.  See, e.g., In re Williams, 2000 WL 222033, at *2 (“[W]e find the vagueness 
doctrine applicable . . . because it applies to legislation that lacks clarity and 
precision.”). 
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eight criteria that any legal system must aspire towards: (1) the 
adoption of general rules that permit the system to avoid merely ad 
hoc decision making; (2) the publication of those rules such that 
participants may be capable of knowing what is expected of them; 
(3) the general prohibition on the abuse of retroactive legislation; 
(4) the articulation of the rules such as they may be 
understandable; (5) the coherence of the rules such that the duties 
they impose are not in conflict with one another; (6) the adoption 
of rules that the participants are reasonably capable of obeying; (7) 
the maintenance of a fairly stable set of rules, thereby avoiding 
frequent and disorienting changes; and (8) a congruence between 
the rules adopted and the way in which legal officials enforce and 
administer those rules.163 
Fuller introduced his standards by means of a lengthy allegory, 
one in which conjured monarch-Rex attempts to create a legal 
system for his kingdom in ways that successively violate each of the 
eight principles.164 At each step, the legal system, as an institution, 
breaks down, because the kingdom’s subjects refuse to collectively 
accept the legitimacy of the unworkable scheme. As Fuller then 
announced: 
A total failure in any one of these eight directions does 
not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in 
something that is not properly called a legal system at all, 
except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void 
contract can still be said to be one kind of contract.165 
Fuller thereby expressed an existential view of law’s minimal 
institutional constraints. As the legal philosopher Matthew Kramer 
has already pointed out, however, law—and indeed Fuller’s eight 
precepts engendering law—is as compatible with an evil legal 
system as with a good one.166 A respect for individual cognitive 
autonomy presupposed by the eight precepts, for example, as 
readily pertains when a bank robber orders his victim to do certain 
things, because, in that instance, the robber implicitly 
acknowledges his victim’s capacity for rational reflection and 
 
 163.  See FULLER, supra note 63, at 39. 
 164.  Id. at 33–38. 
 165.  See id. at 39. Fuller’s adjectival use of total is important to note, given his 
further acknowledgment that “the inner morality of law is condemned to remain 
largely a morality of aspiration and not of duty. Its primary appeal must be to a 
sense of trusteeship and to the pride of the craftsman.” Id. at 43. 
 166.  See KRAMER, supra note 4, at 44, 59–60; see also HART, supra note 3, at 211. 
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decision making.167 Fuller himself qualifies the significance of his 
desiderata by conceding that, “[w]ith respect to the demands of 
legality other than promulgation, then, the most we can expect of 
constitutions and courts is that they save us from the abyss; they 
cannot be expected to lay out very many compulsory steps toward 
truly significant accomplishment.”168 Because Fuller’s constraints 
implicate the legal system’s ability to survive and persist as an 
institution, we can adapt them to our institutional approach 
without accepting the inference he draws to an inner morality for 
law. 
The legal system assigns status functions by promulgating rules 
and standards to the officials who assume the duty of formulating, 
administering, or implementing the law in specific and more 
generalized areas.169 As with any institution charged with a practical 
functionality, a legal system would dissipate and be rendered 
ineffectual were its assignments of rights, duties, and 
responsibilities to be conveyed in a manner requiring so much 
interpretation as to render it incapable of guiding the participants’ 
conduct. Rules or standards imparted solely by parable or riddle, 
for instance, to suggest a scenario at the extreme would be so vague 
and confusing as to be unworkable and impracticable.170 
For the most part, the meaning of a law, and of the legal duty 
it imposes, must be capable of being easily understood by those 
charged with the duty. Community members develop an evaluative 
attitude and justified expectations that legal officials will adhere to 
the status functions assigned to them and legal officials, like 
 
 167.  KRAMER, supra note 4, at 59. 
 168.  FULLER, supra note 63, at 44. Fuller’s justification for the promulgation 
condition somewhat parallels Searle’s claims for the institutional exactness 
constraint. Fuller says the requirement that laws be published “does not rest on 
any such absurdity as an expectation that the dutiful citizen will sit down and read 
them all” but rather on the practical conclusion that those who do know the law 
will by their behavior indirectly influence the others similarly to observe the law. 
Id. Although Fuller also includes moral language, such that each citizen is “at least 
entitled to know” the law, even if not individually studying it, he lays out an 
institutional dynamic by which power is assigned and maintained. Id. at 51. 
 169.  See, e.g., Hills, supra note 85, at 181 (“[C]ompetition between federal and 
non-federal officials for implementation authority helps insure that federal laws 
are implemented by officials who are both faithful to the purposes of such laws yet 
independent from Congress.”). 
 170.  Cf. Note, supra note 85, at 407 (arguing that certain “standards laid down 
by the [Supreme] Court are so vague that they do not offer a workable basis for 
distinguishing” requirements of the Securities Act of 1933). 
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officials in other institutions, commit themselves in a public way to 
satisfy those expectations.171 There are no doubt exceptions, such as 
when a legislature enacts an abhorrent law, or even when private 
contractual parties execute an unconscionable agreement, known 
to offend judicial sensibilities.172 But in such cases expectations of 
judicial enforcement may not be justified. 
Although Fuller’s eight conditions do not necessitate an 
internal morality for law, they are compelling indicia of the 
intentionality and exactness constraints that maintain law’s 
institutional power structures and relations. More to the point, 
these conditions help locate some of the focal points that may 
engender nonmoral theoretical disagreement over the standards 
governing those institutional constraints. Participants disagree over 
whether a ruling may have been general enough to cover their 
circumstance, whether a rule as published clearly enough supports 
a litigant’s construction, and so forth. Disputes over the standards 
governing such guideposts, e.g., generality, clarity, 
understandability, coherence, and capability of being obeyed, are 
not in the first instance moral ones, and, indeed, legal officials will 
often have little patience for a detour into moral argumentation 
about them.173 
Less anecdotally, while non-positivists may deny that Nazi 
edicts were law,174 it is not apparent that they would deny the Nazi 
apparatus to have been an institution. For a regime committed to 
evil, dispute over institutional constraints qualifying as theoretical 
would persist by virtue of the system’s institutional structures and 
needs, but could hardly be seen as inevitably grounded in the 
furtherance of best moral outcomes. If such theoretical dispute 
over institutional constraints is more easily accepted as a matter of 
social fact but not morality, this only goes to show that theoretical 
dispute in law qua institution similarly need not be seen as rooted 
in moral controversy. 
 
 171.  See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 88. 
 172.  See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 186–87 (2004). 
 173.  E.g., Southard v. Morris, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1913) 
(“Returning from the digression of moralism, the point urged by counsel for 
plaintiff is that the precedents all support the view that the question should have 
been submitted to the jury and counsel have produced landmark decisions in 
support of his claim.”). 
 174.  DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 15, at 411–12. 
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As shown with regard to institutions generally, law’s 
continuous functioning and maintenance depends on more than 
collective recognition of the duties and obligations imposed by 
rules, standards, and other devices for assigning status functions 
within the legal institution. People upon whom a duty has been 
imposed, or to whom a power has been conferred, will be unable to 
fulfill that duty or exercise that power unless the community 
around them engages in some minimal level of cooperation 
chaperoned by a collective intentionality (most significantly the 
group’s collective beliefs and ordinary intentions), which accepts 
the legal rules and principles as reasons for conduct.175 The citizen 
will apply for a passport before trying to travel abroad, engage in a 
certain ritual when making a will, stop at the red light, refrain from 
fixing prices, and so on. The student may become a lawyer, who 
may become a judge, at each stage holding a distinctive status and a 
set of obligations arising by virtue of that status. 
The prescriptions followed in these instances will tend toward 
being sufficiently exact to be capable of being understood, even if 
sometimes on the basis of the retained expertise of others more 
qualified. But what also must be understood is the fact itself of 
collective acceptance. It would not be enough for Ms. Jones to 
follow a rule believing it to be meant only for her. She should 
understand that others similarly situated are not adhering to 
divergent rules or generally following practices that may be at cross-
purposes with her own, but are engaged in the same overall 
enterprise.176 
This is not to say that the rules and standards in a legal system 
must serve the ends of equality or fairness. Laws may be sufficiently 
clear and exact to guide community members in achieving 
oppressive inequality or unfair domination and deprivation, and 
these may be a legal system’s intentional objectives.177 But even 
under this scenario, the precision of the power relations specified 
by the rules permits subjects to know and obey the laws, which are 
 
 175.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 58. 
 176.  See generally Raz, Introduction, supra note 121, at 10 (“I should recognize 
that other people are in my position and that if we all adopt a coordinating 
practice to follow the directives of a certain body within certain limits then we will 
all be able to establish and preserve justified coordinative practices which would 
otherwise evade our grasp.”). 
 177.  See Hart, supra note 14, at 616 (calling the Nazi legal system “a Hell 
created on earth for men by other men”). 
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in turn capable of standing as desire-independent reasons for 
action.178 
Nor should the idea of a fairly equal assignment of rights and 
imposition of duties across the community rule out non-general, 
particularized expressions of law. In other words, an important 
aspect of the legal system is its flexibility in addressing localized or 
particular matters.179 A town’s zoning board, for instance, is 
charged with weighing several factors in deciding whether to grant 
Philippe Ifrah a variance to subdivide her property.180 What is 
assumed by the larger community, however, is that each citizen—or 
at least each similarly situated (and similarly empowered) citizen—
would receive fairly equal treatment, the same factors being 
balanced, were they to apply for such a variance. 
It should be noted that George Fletcher has offered an 
interesting objection to the notion that the constitutive rules by 
which law assigns status functions “must find support in the 
attitudes of those for whom the institutional fact resonates as 
true.”181 Fletcher, who has therein offered one of the few responses 
thus far to Searle’s institutional philosophy as it may pertain to law, 
responds that it is validity, rather than social acceptance, which 
functions as the chief criterion of a law’s “having force.”182 Laws are 
deemed binding, in other words, not necessarily because they are 
widely accepted by the society, but rather because they have been 
validly enacted. As an example, Fletcher refers to the case of gay 
and lesbian marriages, which might hypothetically be recognized as 
“legal” by various legislatures, but which may at the same time not 
be “accepted” by society except in a narrow “technical” sense.183 
Being the prime mover behind a fairly original area of 
philosophical thought, Searle himself has acknowledged that his 
theory of institutions is nascent and will need to be ironed out.184 
Even so, it appears that the present theory is powerful enough to 
afford significant insight into controversy over the concept of legal 
 
 178.  See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 70; 
SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 127–31. 
 179.  See generally RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 81, at 216. 
 180.  Ifrah v. Utschig, 774 N.E.2d 732, 733–34 (N.Y. 2002). 
 181.  Fletcher, supra note 84, at 98. 
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id. at 99. 
 184.  Searle, What Is an Institution?, supra note 43, at 10. 
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validity, based on the idea that the assignment of status functions 
requires collective recognition and acceptance to work. 
First, Searle points out that “acceptance” need not imply 
approval, but rather, may occur along a continuum beginning with 
a very weak grudging acknowledgment of the assignment.185 In 
other words, the sort of collective recognition and acceptance 
discussed throughout this article should not be construed to imply 
endorsement. The level of acceptance of non-heterosexual 
marriage that Fletcher labels “technical” should, at the least, rise to 
the level of acknowledgment, however grudging, that such 
marriages have been deemed “legal” in the relevant jurisdictions, 
that such marriages are thenceforth “entitled,” at least within the 
existing legal system to the same legal benefits as heterosexual 
ones, and that the political and legislative mechanisms, themselves 
accepted by the society, have acted validly. 
Second, and rooted in the logic of institutional power 
structures, the legal validity of the legislation provides community 
members with “desire-independent” reasons for action, namely, a 
recognition of the marriages and their now legal trappings. These 
desire-independent reasons function precisely because they may 
run counter to, or serve to exclude, what the participants may 
believe to be right or may desire for themselves.186 They will 
understand that the declaration of certain words in a certain 
context, on the part of a same-sex couple, now counts as assigning 
to that couple the status of being married. Although the odd baker 
may refuse to take a wedding cake order from a gay couple, or the 
odd county clerk to stamp marriage licenses,187 even they may 
grudgingly acknowledge their legal obligation to do so absent a 
 
 185.  Id. at 10; SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 8. 
 186.  SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 30, at 70; SEARLE, 
MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 127–31; cf. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS 
AND NORMS, supra note 62, at 183 (“An exclusionary reason merely requires us to 
avoid something which other reasons make legitimate, but do not require.”). 
 187.  Michael Paulsen & Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in Arizona Cheers Bill 
Allowing Businesses to Refuse to Serve Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/us/religious-right-in-arizona-cheers-bill-
allowing-businesses-to-refuse-to-serve-gays.html; Sarah Kaplan & James Higdon, The 
Defiant Kim Davis, the Ky. Clerk Who Refuses to Issue Gay Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST 
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further exemption granted—at least in the interim until subjected 
to constitutional review—by their legislature.188 
V. LAW’S WIDESPREAD “THEORETICAL” DISPUTES ARE NONMORAL 
CONTROVERSIES ABOUT EXACTNESS AND COLLECTIVE 
INTENTIONALITY 
We might initially protest that, although by any definition the 
legal system certainly qualifies as an institution or set of institutions, 
it hardly seems clear that there is much exactness or expression of 
“collective” beliefs and intentions involved in legislation and 
judicial decision-making.189 How will it make sense, therefore, to 
apply the exactness and intentionality constraints to an analysis of 
law? And if these constraints are included in the analysis, how will 
we not end up diluting our concept of law of its peculiar 
institutional character? 
We would, for instance, call the well-worn rule vehicles are 
prohibited in the park a “law” when adopted by the appropriate law-
making body. But this does not mean that the rule manifests 
official intentions and beliefs to sufficiently convey legal duties and 
obligations in a particular case. The rule is exact in a sense, but 
fairly imprecise when one considers bicycles, roller skates, or 
ambulances responding to an emergency.190 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the inherent inexactness of 
language—and therefore of declarations, rules and laws—should 
actually support, far more than it may tend to refute, a Searlean 
institutional explanation of legal phenomena central to the long 
debate over law’s nature. Specifically, the institutional pull within 
 
 188.  Paulsen & Santos, supra note 187 (“Most states where same-sex marriage 
is legal have exemptions for religious organizations, but not for private businesses 
or individuals.”). 
 189.  See generally Howard, supra note 7, at 390 (emphasizing that language and 
hence legal documents are inexact and indeterminate, and require extensive 
interpretation); Chris Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: 
Llewellyn Redux, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (1984) (book review) (noting the 
legal realists’ view that “language and rules are inherently imprecise and 
manipulable . . . and that formal or mechanistic approaches to the law mask the 
far more complex relationships between law and the rest of life”). 
 190.  HART, supra note 3, at 607; see, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne, 505 
P.2d 732, 735 (Kan. 1973) (addressing whether chickens are animals for purposes 
of statute forbidding cruelty to animals); White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Rest., 
LLC, No. 2006196313, 2006 WL 3292641, at *1 (Mass. Oct. 31, 2006) (deciding 
whether the term “sandwiches” includes burritos, tacos and quesadillas). 
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law toward compliance with the intentionality and exactness 
constraints provides an interesting explanation of the 
argumentative structure of legal practice. Moreover, this reason 
may be more accessible, and ultimately more fitting, than 
Dworkin’s because it need not rely upon a structure “hidden” 
beneath the surface of legal decision making.191 Rather, the will to 
comply with institutional constraints upon the creation and 
exercise of deontic power should be fairly well apparent on the 
surface of judicial decisions. 
Dworkin viewed controversy in law as rooted in dispute over 
moral content, with judges seeking to determine which legal—or 
moral hence legal—principle best fits the conflict at hand and 
justifies the new outcome.192 Constructive interpretation rejects the 
idea of an “existing law” in which there will be a distinct collection of 
legal rules, principles, and other standards.193 In a Dworkinian 
world, the right answer to legal cases should follow from our best 
interpretation of the data at hand, applying a principled 
consistency over time, using the soundest principles and standards 
of theory construction drawn from society’s political morality.194 
This is, for Dworkin, the hidden structure of legal 
argumentation, which engenders widespread theoretical 
disagreement in pursuit not only of justice and fairness, but 
integrity.195 A precedent carries a “gravitational force” that “escapes 
the language of its opinion.”196 It is at Dworkin’s second, 
“interpretive” stage, in the process of justifying the practice and 
placing law’s existing materials in their best light, and then also at 
the fairly marginal third, “post-interpretive” or “reforming” stage of 
the constructive interpretive exercise—at which interpreters fine-
tune their sense of what the legal practice “really” requires so as to 
 
 191.  See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 265. 
 192.  Id. at 7–8, 225, 285 (setting out his view that lawyers and judges “are 
really disagreeing about . . . issues of morality and fidelity,” and that such 
controversy is rooted in “principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due 
process” based on “some general scheme of moral responsibility”); Ronald 
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1084, 1096 (1975). 
 193.  DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 343–44 (“I do want 
to reject . . . the picture of ‘existing law’ . . . . There is no such thing as ‘the law’ as 
a collection of discrete propositions, each with its own canonical form.”). 
 194.  Cf. Soper, supra note 1, at 1741–42 (discussing Dworkin’s theory as just 
stated). 
 195.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 166. 
 196.  DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 7, at 112–13. 
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best serve the moral justification located at the second stage—that 
consensus becomes far less likely and theoretical disagreement may 
abound.197 
The theory of adjudication that views the “gravitational”—and 
deontic—force of institutionally binding determinations as 
“escaping” or being “hidden” from the language of those decisions 
appears to stand in quite some contrast to Searle’s view of the logic 
of institutions. Recall that, for Searle, constitutive rules that 
construct the institution consist in speech acts known as “standing 
[d]eclarations.”198 It is by virtue of those declarations that 
institutions permit the individuals, entities, or objects involved to 
“count as” having a certain significance and status within the 
institution. At the same time, regulative rules that govern behavior 
within the institution are known, in linguistic terms, as “standing 
[d]irectives.”199 
This is not to say that institutional rules do not have 
“gravitational force” that transcends the language used to frame 
them or that they do not require constant interpretation. The 
point, however, is that the linguistic expression is primary. When 
an institution assigns power, it intends to communicate, and 
thereby needs to be fairly clear and precise lest the assignment be 
futile and incapable of collective recognition. Determining what 
sort of deontic power the declaration assigns is conceptually prior 
to an interpretation that may “escape” the language. 
Like other speakers, courts and legislatures rely on linguistic 
conventions to convey meaning in an efficient and repeatable 
manner.200 In the institutional setting, the question is what power 
the declaration or declaring entity intends and believes itself to 
assign—whether a positive power, such as a right, or a negative 
power, such as a duty or obligation—and with what level of 
exactness that assignment has been made. Language functions in 
 
 197.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 66–67, 230–31 (setting out his 
theory of the three stages by which law is constructively interpreted). 
 198.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 97. 
 199.  Id. (explaining that a regulative rule, such as “Drive on the right hand 
side of the road,” functions as a standing directive aimed at conditioning the 
behavior of drivers); see supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text (providing 
examples showing the distinction between standing directives and standing 
declarations).  
 200.  See SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 19, at 73–74. 
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the institutional setting to constitute, as well as describe, the 
obligation, right, or duty intended to be assigned.201 
When citizens want to learn what legal right or duty they may 
have in a situation, they look to the statutory and regulatory 
materials, writings, sanctions, or permissions that the law will 
enforce, as well as any legal decisions that bear on the issue. Legal 
officials do the same when trying to figure out how to treat a case. 
By looking for authorities that bear on the issue, these participants 
seek out the data most exactly to the point. If the authority appears 
close enough to be decisive, the work in most cases is done. As 
Justice Roger Traynor put it: 
[A] judge invariably takes precedent as his starting point; 
he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of 
ancestral judicial experience: the given decisions or, 
lacking these, the given clues. Even if his search of the 
past yields nothing, so that he confronts a truly 
unprecedented case, he still arrives at a decision in the 
context of judicial reasoning with recognizable ties to the 
past; by its kinship thereto it not only establishes the 
unprecedented case as a precedent for the future, but 
integrates it into the often rewoven but always unbroken 
line with the past. A judge is constrained not only to heed 
the relevant judicial past in arriving at a decision, but also 
to arrive at it within as straight and narrow a path as 
possible.202 
There should be an intuitive consensus about Trainor’s view of 
the judge’s duty. Few would disagree that the court’s deliberation, 
even when not bound by a controlling precedent, is constrained by 
standards.203 The path, as straight and narrow as possible, 
“establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the 
future;”204 but the question remains whether this is accomplished 
owing to the moral content of law’s embedded standards and 
principles, or by way of judicial discretion which creates the new 
precedent as an expression of the court’s evolving practical 
philosophy about what the law, and self-referentially the institution, 
should be. 
 
 201.  SEARLE, FREEDOM AND NEUROBIOLOGY, supra note 66, at 93. 
 202.  Traynor, supra note 104, at 774–75. 
 203.  See Raz, supra note 106, at 115 (setting forth normative theses concerning 
the types of argument required to justify claims that authority is legitimate and the 
factors that should guide the exercise of practical authority). 
 204.  Traynor, supra note 104, at 775. 
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Dworkin said that the argumentative structure of legal 
practice, which involves theoretical disagreement “about the 
soundest interpretation of some pertinent aspect of judicial 
practice,”205 counts in favor of the non-positivist construction that 
asserts law’s moral ground. This article presupposes theoretical 
disagreement, but contends that the conceptually prior 
disagreement that happens in a theoretical and widespread way is a 
dispute over standards of exactness and intentionality. The 
controversy is thereby, in the first instance, over the social fact of 
whether, gauged by those standards, the given law and decisions 
yield the outcome. 
The non-positivist claim has always presupposed that 
theoretical disagreement in law rests on personal and political 
morality, and “usually raises moral issues.”206 For Dworkin, 
theoretical disagreement wrestles over the correct way to interpret 
the data or practice before the court, an exercise grounded on the 
moral quest to make legal practice the best social practice it can 
be.207 Even in Dworkinian terms, however, theoretical disagreement 
is not necessarily grounded in morality. For this, unadorned, is a 
controversy “about the grounds of law, about which other kinds of 
propositions, when true, make a particular proposition of law 
true.”208 Paraphrasing, the parties to a dispute will be engaged in a 
Dworkinian theoretical disagreement when they disagree about 
what must occur in the legal system before a proposition of law can 
be said to be true.209 
And even for Dworkin, an interpretation may justify because it 
fits, and therefore “the distinction between the two dimensions is 
less crucial or profound than it might seem.”210 The question of fit 
alone should be an area of substantial disagreement.211 At one 
extreme, dissents in legal decisions sometimes charge that the 
majority has ignored a controlling precedent and the majority may 
 
 205.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 87. 
 206.  BESSON, supra note 61, at 23; Shapiro, supra note 6, at 44. 
 207.  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 1, at 293. 
 208.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 5. 
 209.  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 1, at 285. 
 210.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 231. 
 211.  See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1561, 1571 (1994) (“[E]ven the threshold question of whether the statute was 
ambiguous presented a hard case.”) (citing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF 
JUDGES 70–71 (1993)). 
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say the same about the dissenting view.212 In the usual and 
ubiquitous practice, though, the debate is whether or to what 
extent the precedents cited by the adversary are distinguishable 
from the case before the court.213 Doctrines are also parsed and 
distinguished.214 Before the new dispute arises, existing legal 
sources—whether they be as general as a statute or judicial holding, 
or as individualized as a zoning variance or contract—define the 
status functions that constitute legal relations and regulate society. 
The non-positivist view has taken theoretical disagreement to 
be fairly lofty, involving dispute that goes to the core of political 
morality. If, however, legal controversy comes down to the 
widespread jockeying over standards of exactness and 
intentionality, including issues such as ambiguity and 
distinguishability, then theoretical disagreement is rather 
quotidian. But that is quite the point: theoretical disagreement is 
recurrent, hence quotidian. Yet positivists have acquiesced in the 
grander view and have thereby engaged in responding to the 
“powerful” challenge.215 
Hart came to believe that “soft” or inclusive positivism, by 
which the identification of law may sometimes depend upon moral 
criteria and the “open texture” of language which renders law 
incomplete in hard cases, are the vehicles by which to answer 
Dworkin’s claim of theoretical disagreement in law.216 The 
problem, however, is to account for theoretical disagreement that 
not only occurs in law, but that is widespread. Hart was 
conceptually deterred from acknowledging any such widespread 
controversy owing to his theoretical commitment to law’s certainty-
providing function. While not “paramount and overriding,” the 
 
 212.  See Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Grp. Long Term Disability Ins. 
Program, 189 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 1999) (saying that, although the dissent 
“claims that we . . . ignore controlling precedent . . . , we feel that our precedents 
require our decision today”). 
 213.  See United States v. Clark, 163 F.App’x. 799, 801 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Clark 
gives us no sound reason for his position, and he is not able to distinguish 
precedent that is closely on point, the logic of which applies to this issue.”); 
Carson v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 80 S.E. 1080, 1081 (N.C. 1914) (noting that prior case 
was “so closely analogous as not to be distinguishable”). 
 214.  E.g., Arnold v. All Am. Assurance Co., 499 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Ark. 1973) 
(“In the law of agency the concept of ratification is closely related to the doctrine 
of estoppel, even though the two may be distinguished.”). 
 215.  Shapiro, supra note 6, at 35. 
 216.  HART, supra note 3, at 251–52. 
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certainty-providing function of the rule of recognition 
presupposed, for Hart, some limit on the degree of uncertainty that 
a society could tolerate.217 
What should be considered, however, is the disconnect 
between legal philosophy—wherein the philosopher wrangles over 
the concept of legal validity—and the practice it interprets.218 
Ubiquitous tension in litigated cases over standards of exactness 
and intentionality explains the appearance of widespread 
theoretical disagreement from a nonmoral perspective. The legal 
norms set out in the prior case may or may not apply in the present 
one, with its dissimilar (in varying degrees) factual context. This 
uncertainty has been taken to result from an inherent vagueness in 
the language used and now needing to be “precisified [sic]” for 
application in the new context.219 
In other respects, however, it is widespread stability and the 
lack of biting controversy rooted in political morality that 
characterizes legal systems. Were the implications of a substantial 
portion of institutional norms to be indeterminate, then the 
institution’s status would itself be fledgling or doubtful—an 
arrangement striving to be a legal system.220 The view, however, that 
law’s argumentative structure engenders nonmoral disagreement—
arising from controversy over the standards governing the 
intentionality and exactness constraints—should align with Hart’s 
insight that, while the existence of law is relatively certain, law’s 
application in particular cases may be significantly controversial.221 
The present view may also benefit the Dworkinian approach to 
some extent, by tamping down if not resolving an irksome paradox. 
In Dworkin’s interpretive model, legal principles are identified in 
the exercise in which they are set forth to justify the legal 
practice.222 Yet, the interpretive exercise seeking principles that fit 
the prior practice is epistemically prior. Principles must both fit 
and justify the legal practice at the second stage, and then, at the 
third, be fine-tuned based on the interpreter’s best substantive 
convictions about the practice and the principles identified at the 
 
 217.  Id. at 252. 
 218.  See MARMOR, supra note 83, at 4. 
 219.  SOAMES, supra note 72, at 289; HART, supra note 3, at 128. 
 220.  KRAMER, supra note 4, at 142–44. 
 221.  HART, supra note 3, at 160. 
 222.  See supra text accompanying note 131. 
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second stage.223 In the Dworkinian scheme we are more 
knowledgeable, and there is less controversy, about principles 
identified as fitting the practice and then we are left to ask more 
controversially whether the principles justify the practice. If, 
however, legal principles can only be demarcated at the latter stage 
involving justification, how can these be known to us at the 
epistemically prior interpretive stage gauging fit? 
Rooting much of legal controversy in disagreement over 
standards of exactness and intentionality relocates the ground of 
theoretical disagreement to the interpretive exercise in which 
principles are measured for fit. This case must be decided and its 
degree of difference from the prior case becomes the focus of 
dispute. Each participant—whether an official or a litigant—asks 
whether the existing legal data, with its embedded norms, support 
her own interpretation with sufficient intention and specificity.224 
Remaining open to the inevitable claim that existing legal materials 
are “distinguishable,” the court implicitly acknowledges that its 
decision making may cover greater terrain than provided by the 
given materials. 
Engaging in this exercise by deciding which rights and duties 
have been intended or sufficiently specified, or alternatively which 
the law should assign, judges reflectively engage in the development 
of their practical philosophy concerning the court’s institutional 
role. Developing their practical philosophy, judges do not passively 
receive societal norms but actively participate in norm 
elaboration.225 Portions of prior decisions not necessary to the 
holding, and thereby not contained within the holding’s 
intentional contents, are dismissed as “obiter dicta,”226 and dicta 
becomes law if later adopted.227 
 
 223.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 228. 
 224.  E.g., Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 699 N.E.2d 376, 378–79 (N.Y. 1998) 
(disagreeing over whether, by the language and purpose of the National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and its legislative history, Congress intended to 
preempt state common law claims for injuries arising from the lack of a driver’s-
side air bag). 
 225.  See Diver, supra note 123, at 1441 (discussing suggestions by Christopher 
F. Edley, Jr., “on how a reviewing court would go about elaborating norms of 
sound governance and how the judiciary could be better equipped, by training 
and expert assistance, for the demands of such a challenging assignment”). 
 226.  See Shearin v. Wayne Davis & Co., P.C., 637 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. 2006). 
 227.  E.g., State v. Fahringer, 666 P.2d 514, 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
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The legal system necessarily wields power, but fulfillment of 
the epistemic exactness constraint is requisite to the attribution of 
power. When the legal system adopts the rule vehicles prohibited in 
the park, one side may argue that the exactness constraint has not 
been satisfied when it comes to a certain thing. The claim that law’s 
power has not reached the use of that thing is, in effect, a claim 
that the thing does not exist within the rule’s collective intentional 
content. Not, that is, until sufficiently precise social facts exist by 
which citizens may be able to delimit vehicle in the desired way. 
Secondary rules, and in particular “rules of change,”228 give the 
procedure for changing the law. A statute of wills, for instance, might 
be seen as a rule of change from the statutory default distribution 
of property should a person die intestate.229 Nearly by definition 
then, the content of the testator’s choice of whom to favor in his will 
results from extralegal considerations, whether this is persuasive 
authority or, more likely, the nonlinguistic influence of personal 
affections. 
Persuasive authority runs the gamut, from the opinions of co-
equal courts to legislative histories to legal treatises to Aristotle.230 A 
great source of the compelling nature of Dworkin’s view is that, 
indeed, courts will hold out their reliance upon persuasive 
authority to be a legal, as opposed to extralegal, exercise. In the 
classic case of Sherwood v. Walker,231 for instance, Hiram Walker 
agreed to sell his cow, Rose 2d of Aberlone, to the banker, T. C. 
Sherwood, both parties falsely believing Rose was barren.232 Said the 
court: 
This question as to the passing of title is fraught with 
difficulties, and not always easy of solution. An 
examination of the multitude of cases bearing upon this 
subject, with their infinite variety of facts, and at least 
apparent conflict of law, ofttimes [sic] tends to confuse 
rather than to enlighten the mind of the inquirer. It is 
best, therefore, to consider always, in cases of this kind, 
 
 228.  HART, supra note 3, at 95–96 (explaining that the most basic “rules of 
change” authorize officials to alter or adopt new primary rules of conduct for the 
ordinary citizen subject to those primary rules). 
 229.  See Jeremy Waldron, Who Needs Rules of Recognition, in THE RULE OF 
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 327, 330–31 (Matthew D. Adler & 
Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). 
 230.  Flanders, supra note 98, at 63–64. 
 231.  33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). 
 232.  Id. at 920. 
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the general principles of the law, and then apply them as 
best we may to the facts of the case in hand.233 
However, the Sherwood court then disregarded existing legal 
principles as applied to horses and opted for a new legal rule 
channeling Aristotle’s Categories.234 The dissenting opinion agreed 
with the Aristotelian language, but insisted that prior authority 
“clearly sustains the views I have taken.”235 This was a controversy 
over the standards inhering in the legal system’s institutional 
exactness and intentionality constraints. 
The primary controversy in Sherwood was whether law about 
horse trading was sufficiently “directed at” cow bargaining. It was 
also about whether prior law concerning a mutual mistake over the 
soundness of a horse was sufficiently directed at larger situations 
reaching mutual mistakes over bovine fertility. These issues suggest 
disagreement rooted in the intentionality constraint.236 The 
controversy might also be seen as stemming from disagreement 
over whether the existing law covered the present situation with 
sufficient exactness. The practitioner’s first question in Sherwood 
was whether there had been a sufficiently precise assignment of 
Walker’s right to rescind, Sherwood’s obligation to replevy, or his 
entitlement to walk away with unexpected profit in hand.237 
Exactness and intentionality disputes reveal the conceptually 
prior layer of controversy, and account for the argumentative 
structure of legal practice. The controversy arises when one side 
claims that a precedent covers the new kind of circumstance, while 
the other side deems the new situation to be of an unprecedented 
kind; this disagreement typically boils down to competing litigation 
stances in which one side defines the kind broadly enough to 
 
 233.  Id. at 921. 
 234.  Id. at 923 (fashioning a rule using the terms “substance,” “quality,” and 
“accident” derived from Aristotle’s Categories 3b10). See Aristotle, Categories 3b10, in 1 
THE COMPLETE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE 3, 6 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Oxford trans., 
1984) (1956). 
 235.  Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 926 (Sherwood, J., dissenting). 
 236.  See MARMOR, supra note 83, at 129–31 (showing that there may well be 
secondary disputes regarding intentionality, including over the method for 
determining judicial and legislative intention in the ordinary sense); cf. Marc L. 
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 187 n.179 (2008) 
(indicating that this level of disagreement should be minimized with regard to 
judicial decisions, which by their nature tend to supply reasoning and thereby, or 
at least, claim to be somewhat transparent). 
 237.  Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 921. 
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support its expansive view, while the opposing side defines the kind 
so narrowly as to exclude it from consideration.238 The non-
positivist approach has been too eager to move from the realm of 
fit into the conceptually richer domain of justification. 
Nevertheless, Dworkin, for example, held out the search for a 
morally best outcome in the case of Riggs v. Palmer,239 as 
characteristic of legal practice.240 Even in Riggs, in which Elmer had 
murdered his grandfather in order to gain his inheritance, the 
outcome-determinative disagreement did not center on the moral 
issue. The entire appellate panel agreed that morality would 
frustrate Elmer’s scheme.241 The judges disputed whether the case 
should be decided in accord with the morally required outcome. 
They struggled to delimit their theoretical disagreement to the 
standard by which to weigh the presumed collective intention of 
the legislators against the precision of their statutory language 
regulating the making of testamentary documents. 
Even for the limited range of cases arising from the unsettled 
construction of constitutional or statutory clauses, and in which 
different interpretive methodologies are available, the issue of 
whether prior legal assertions and stipulations are sufficiently 
directed to the question typically takes priority over, and often 
preempts, any theoretical debate concerning interpretive 
approaches.242 Owing to its institutional logic, the legal system 
 
 238.  See QUINE, supra note 17, at 5 (explaining that our definition of concepts 
and our understanding of dispositions may vary depending upon how narrowly or 
broadly we define the sort the thing, the “kind,” at issue). 
 239.  22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
 240.  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 15–20. 
 241.  Compare Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190 (wherein the majority opinion asks, 
“[u]nder such circumstances, what law, human or divine, will allow him to take the 
estate and enjoy the fruits of his crime?”), with Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191 (Grey, J., 
dissenting) (agreeing that, “if I believed that the decision of the question could be 
effected by considerations of an equitable nature, I should not hesitate to assent to 
views which commend themselves to the conscience”). 
 242.  See Lan-Dale Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 431, 435 (2009) (“While the 
Court would have been quite comfortable following [a different] position . . . that 
option is not available. The Court has no choice but to follow the precedent . . . , 
but it does so grudgingly, hoping that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 might be restored to its 
original intent in the near future.”); Phillips v. City of Oakland, No. C 07-3885 CW, 
2008 WL 1901005, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2008) (declining to decide with 
plaintiff, stating “[p]laintiff . . . urges the Court to apply an interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause based on the original intent of the framers of the Constitution. 
Even if the Court were inclined to adopt such an interpretation, however, it is not 
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ascribes a higher status to prior status function assignments, as 
evidenced by the existing legal materials, than to theoretical debate 
not arising from institutional exactness and intentionality 
constraints.243 
A constructive interpreter may ask which outcome is morally 
best but, apart from questions of competence, this is not the 
practitioner’s priority. The existing law, as communicated in the 
legal materials, might have successfully assigned rights and 
obligations, such that the parties and legal officials are able 
collectively to recognize the content of this assignment of positive 
and negative powers.244 The idea of this sort of success is a loose 
one, and a matter of degree, hinging on whether the current 
matter is resolved because the current participants consider 
themselves to be grasping, and covered by, the intentions expressed 
in the earlier determination. If so, the parties and officials are 
under the sway of desire-independent institutional reasons to act. If 
not, or occasionally because it seems time for a change, they turn to 
the complex network of persuasive authority derived from moral 
reasoning and other sources. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recent social and institutional philosophy affords us new 
analytic tools for assessing the logic and dynamics of institutions. 
Applying this new thinking to legal philosophy sheds further light 
on how we can move the latter project beyond the well-rehearsed 
parameters of the Hart-Dworkin debate. Efforts to do so in the past 
few years have been compelling, but are subject to challenge. This 
 
free to disregard established precedent”); Lowery v. Haithcock, 79 S.E.2d 204, 
208–09 (N.C. 1953) (“Our former decisions have liberalized the lien statute upon 
which plaintiff relies—perhaps beyond the original intent. Even so, we must apply 
the statute as heretofore construed by this Court.”). 
 243.  Although case precedents afford a legal system a mobile and efficient 
means of assigning status functions and of adjusting prior assignments and 
functions, this article is ultimately neutral with regard to a theory of judicial 
precedent. Its thesis is consistent with the idea that there may be a legal system in 
which officials are assigned status functions obligating them to disregard or 
devalue prior case decisions, and thereby not to treat those individual decisions as 
carrying status-function-assignment functions. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Linking 
Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1206 
(“China does not publish U.S.-style case reporters or even formally recognize 
judicial precedent.”). 
 244.  See MARMOR, supra note 83, at 21–22. 
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is not to say that the recent work on institutions and social ontology 
has necessarily been well applied here, or the current 
developments in legal philosophy well challenged. But perhaps this 
article has suggested a new approach for reconciling the 
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